Abstract

Sassafras is a novel consensus protocol designed to address the recurring fork-related challenges encountered in other lottery-based protocols.

The protocol aims to create a mapping between each epoch’s slots and the authorities set while ensuring that the identity of authorities assigned to the slots remains undisclosed until the slot is actively claimed during block production.

1. Motivation

Sassafras Protocol has been rigorously described in a comprehensive research paper authored by the Web3 Foundation research team.

This RFC is primarily intended to detail the critical implementation aspects vital for ensuring interoperability and to clarify certain aspects that are left open by the research paper and thus subject to interpretation during implementation.

1.1. Relevance to Implementors

This RFC focuses on providing implementors with the necessary insights into the core protocol’s operation.

In instances of inconsistency between this document and the research paper, this RFC should be considered authoritative to eliminate ambiguities and ensure interoperability.

1.2. Supporting Sassafras for Polkadot

Beyond promoting interoperability, this RFC also aims to facilitate the implementation of Sassafras within the greater Polkadot ecosystem.

Although the specifics of deployment strategies are beyond the scope of this document, it lays the groundwork for the integration of Sassafras.

2. Stakeholders

The protocol has a central role in the next generation block authoring consensus systems.

2.1. Blockchain Core Developers

Developers responsible for creating blockchains who intend to leverage the benefits offered by the Sassafras Protocol.

2.2. Polkadot Ecosystem Contributors

Developers contributing to the Polkadot ecosystem, both relay-chain and para-chains.

3. Notation

This section outlines the notation adopted throughout this document to ensure clarity and consistency.

3.1. Data Structures Definitions

Data structures are mostly defined using standard ASN.1 syntax with few exceptions.

To ensure interoperability of serialized structures, the order of the fields must match the definitions found within this specification.

3.2. Types Alias

• Unsigned integer: Unsigned ::= INTEGER (0..MAX)
• n-bit unsigned integer: Unsigned<n> ::= INTEGER (0..2^n - 1)
  • 8-bit unsigned integer (octet) Unsigned8 ::= Unsigned<8>
  • 32-bit unsigned integer: Unsigned32 ::= Unsigned<32>
  • 64-bit unsigned integer: Unsigned64 ::= Unsigned<64>
• Non-homogeneous sequence (struct/tuple): Sequence ::= SEQUENCE
• Variable length homogeneous sequence (vector): Sequence<T> ::= SEQUENCE OF T
• Fixed length homogeneous sequence (array): Sequence<T,n> ::= Sequence<T> (SIZE(n))
• Variable length octet-string: OctetString ::= Sequence<Unsigned8>
• Fixed length octet-string: OctetString<n> ::= Sequence<Unsigned8, n>

3.2. Pseudo-Code

It is convenient to make use of code snippets as part of the protocol description. As a convention, the code is formatted in a style similar to Rust, and can make use of the following set of predefined procedures:

Sequences

• CONCAT(x₀: OctetString, ..., xₖ: OctetString) -> OctetString: Concatenates the input octet-strings as a new octet string.

• LENGTH(s: Sequence) -> Unsigned: The number of elements in the sequence s.

• GET(s: Sequence<T>, i: Unsigned) -> T: The i-th element of the sequence s.

• PUSH(s: Sequence<T>, x: T): Appends x as the new last element of the sequence s.

• POP(s: Sequence<T>) -> T: extract and returns the last element of the sequence s.

Codec

• ENCODE(x: T) -> OctetString: Encodes x as an OctetString according to SCALE codec.

• DECODE<T>(x: OctetString) -> T: Decodes x as a type T object according to SCALE codec.

Other

• BLAKE2(x: OctetString) -> OctetString<32>: Standard Blake2b hash of x with 256-bit digest.

3.3. Incremental Introduction of Types and Functions

More types and helper functions are introduced incrementally as they become relevant within the document’s context.

4. Protocol Introduction

The timeline is segmented into a sequentially ordered sequence of slots. This entire sequence of slots is further partitioned into distinct segments known as epochs.

Sassafras aims to map each slot within a target epoch to the authorities scheduled for that epoch, utilizing a ticketing system.

The core protocol operation can be roughly divided into four phases.

4.1. Submission of Candidate Tickets

Each authority scheduled for the target epoch generates and shares a set of candidate tickets. Every ticket has an unbiasable pseudo random score and is bundled with an anonymous proof of validity.

4.2. Validation of Candidate Tickets

Each candidate ticket undergoes a validation process for the associated validity proof and compliance with other protocol-specific constraints. Valid tickets are persisted on-chain.

4.3. Tickets Slots Binding

After collecting all valid candidate tickets and before the beginning of the target epoch, a deterministic method is used to uniquely associate a subset of these tickets to the slots of the target epoch.

4.4. Claim of Ticket Ownership

During block production phase of target epoch, the author is required to prove ownership of the ticket associated to the block’s slot. This step discloses the identity of the ticket owner.

5. Bandersnatch VRFs Cryptographic Primitives

This section is not intended to serve as an exhaustive exploration of the mathematically intensive foundations of the cryptographic primitive. Rather, its primary aim is to offer a concise and accessible explanation of the primitives role and interface which is relevant within the scope of the protocol. For a more detailed explanation, refer to the Bandersnatch VRFs technical specification

Bandersnatch VRF comes in two variants:

• Bare VRF: Extension to the IETF ECVRF RFC 9381,
• Ring VRF: Anonymous signatures leveraging zk-SNARK.

Together with the input, which determines the VRF output, both variants offer the capability to sign some arbitrary additional data (extra) which doesn’t contribute to the VRF output.

5.1 Bare VRF Interface

VRF signature construction.

    fn vrf_sign(
        secret: SecretKey,
        input: OctetString,
        extra: OctetString,
    ) -> VrfSignature

VRF signature verification. Returns a Boolean indicating the validity of the signature (1 on success).

    fn vrf_verify(
        public: PublicKey,
        input: OctetString,
        extra: OctetString,
        signature: VrfSignature
    ) -> Unsigned<1>;

VRF output derivation from input and secret.

    fn vrf_output(
        secret: SecretKey,
        input: OctetString,
    ) -> OctetString<32>;

VRF output derivation from a VRF signature.

    fn vrf_signed_output(
        signature: VrfSignature,
    ) -> OctetString<32>;

The following condition is always satisfied:

    let signature = vrf_sign(secret, input, extra);
    vrf_output(secret, input) == vrf_signed_output(signature)

SecretKey, PublicKey and VrfSignature types are intentionally left undefined. Their definitions can be found in the Bandersnatch VRF specification and related documents.

5.4.2. Ring VRF Interface

Ring VRF signature construction.

    fn ring_vrf_sign(
        secret: SecretKey,
        prover: RingProver,
        input: OctetString,
        extra: OctetString,
    ) -> RingVrfSignature;

Ring VRF signature verification. Returns a Boolean indicating the validity of the signature (1 on success). Note that verification doesn’t require the signer’s public key.

    fn ring_vrf_verify(
        verifier: RingVerifier,
        input: OctetString,
        extra: OctetString,
        signature: RingVrfSignature,
    ) -> Unsigned<1>;

VRF output derivation from a ring VRF signature.

    fn ring_vrf_signed_output(
        signature: RingVrfSignature,
    ) -> OctetString<32>;

The following condition is always satisfied:

    let signature = vrf_sign(secret, input, extra);
    let ring_signature = ring_vrf_sign(secret, prover, input, extra);
    vrf_signed_output(signature) == ring_vrf_signed_output(ring_signature);

RingProver, RingVerifier, and RingVrfSignature are intentionally left undefined. Their definitions can be found in the Bandersnatch VRF specification and related documents.

6. Sassafras Protocol

6.1. Protocol Configuration

The ProtocolConfiguration type contains some parameters to tweak the protocol behavior and primarily influences certain checks carried out during tickets validation. It is defined as:

    ProtocolConfiguration ::= Sequence {
        epoch_length: Unsigned32,
        attempts_number: Unsigned8,
        redundancy_factor: Unsigned8,
    }

Where:

• epoch_length: Number of slots for each epoch.
• attempts_number: Maximum number of tickets that each authority is allowed to submit.
• redundancy_factor: Expected ratio between the cumulative number of valid tickets which can be submitted by the scheduled authorities and the epoch’s duration in slots.

The attempts_number influences the anonymity of block producers. As all published tickets have a public attempt number less than attempts_number, all the tickets which share the attempt number value must belong to different block producers, which reduces anonymity late as we approach the epoch tail. Bigger values guarantee more anonymity but also more computation.

Details about how these parameters drive the tickets validity probability can be found in section 6.5.2.

6.2. Header Digest Log

Each block header contains a Digest log, which is defined as an ordered sequence of DigestItems:

    DigestItem ::= Sequence {
        id: OctetString<4>,
        data: OctetString
    }

    Digest ::= Sequence<DigestItem>

The Digest sequence is used to propagate information required for the correct protocol progress. Outside the protocol’s context, the information within each DigestItem is opaque and maps to some SCALE-encoded protocol-specific structure.

For Sassafras related items, the DiegestItems id is set to the ASCII string "SASS"

Possible digest items for Sassafras:

• Epoch change signal: Information about next epoch. This is mandatory for the first block of a new epoch.
• Epoch tickets signal: Sequence of tickets for claiming slots in the next epoch. This is mandatory for the first block in the epoch’s tail
• Slot claim info: Additional data required for block verification. This is mandatory for each block and must be the second-to-last entry in the log.
• Seal: Block signature added by the block author. This is mandatory for each block and must be the last entry in the log.

If any digest entry is unexpected, not found where mandatory or found in the wrong position, then the block is considered invalid.

6.3. On-Chain Randomness

A sequence of four randomness entries is maintained on-chain.

    RandomnessBuffer ::= Sequence<OctetString<32>, 4>

During epoch N:

• The first entry is the current randomness accumulator and incorporates verifiable random elements from all previously executed blocks. The accumulation procedure is described in section 6.10.

• The second entry is the snapshot of the accumulator before the execution of the first block of epoch N. This is the randomness used for tickets targeting epoch N+2.

• The third entry is the snapshot of the accumulator before the execution of the first block of epoch N-1. This is the randomness used for tickets targeting epoch N+1 (the next epoch).

• The third entry is the snapshot of the accumulator before the execution of the first block of epoch N-2. This is the randomness used for tickets targeting epoch N (the current epoch).

The buffer’s entries are updated after each block execution.

6.4. Epoch Change Signal

The first block produced during epoch N must include a descriptor for some of the parameters to be used by the subsequent epoch (N+1).

This signal descriptor is defined as:

    NextEpochDescriptor ::= Sequence {
        randomness: OctetString<32>,
        authorities: Sequence<PublicKey>,
    }

Where:

• randomness: Randomness accumulator snapshot relevant for validation of next epoch blocks. In other words, randomness used to construct the tickets targeting epoch N+1.
• authorities: List of authorities scheduled for next epoch.

This descriptor is SCALE encoded and embedded in a DigestItem.

6.4.1. Startup Parameters

Some of the initial parameters used by the first epoch (#0), are set through the genesis configuration, which is defined as:

    GenesisConfig ::= Sequence {
        authorities: Sequence<PublicKey>,
    }

The on-chain RandomnessBuffer is initialized after the genesis block construction. The first buffer entry is set as the Blake2b hash of the genesis block, each of the other entries is set as the Blake2b hash of the previous entry.

Since block #0 is generated by each node as part of the genesis process, the first block that an authority explicitly produces for epoch #0 is block #1. Therefore, block #1 is required to contain the NextEpochDescriptor for the following epoch.

NextEpochDescriptor for epoch #1:

• randomness: Third entry (index 2) of the randomness buffer.
• authorities: The same sequence as specified in the genesis configuration.

6.5. Tickets Creation and Submission

During epoch N, each authority scheduled for epoch N+2 constructs a set of tickets which may be eligible (6.5.2) for on-chain submission.

These tickets are constructed using the on-chain randomness snapshot taken before the execution of the first block of epoch N together with other parameters and aims to secure ownership of one or more slots of epoch N+2 (target epoch).

Each authority is allowed to submit a maximum number of tickets, constrained by attempts_number field of the ProtocolConfiguration.

The ideal timing for the candidate authority to start constructing the tickets is subject to strategy. A recommended approach is to initiate tickets creation once the last block of epoch N-1 is either probabilistically or, even better, deterministically finalized. This delay is suggested to prevent wasting resources creating tickets that will be unusable if a different chain branch is chosen as canonical.

Tickets generated during epoch N are shared with the tickets relayers, which are the authorities scheduled for epoch N+1. Relayers validate and collect (off-chain) the tickets targeting epoch N+2.

When epoch N+1 starts, collected tickets are submitted on-chain by relayers as inherent extrinsics, a special type of transaction inserted by the block author at the beginning of the block’s transactions sequence.

6.5.1. Ticket Identifier

Each ticket has an associated identifier defined as:

    TicketId ::= OctetString<32>;

The value of TicketId is completely determined by the output of Bandersnatch VRFs given the following unbiasable input:

    let ticket_vrf_input = CONCAT(
        BYTES("sassafras_ticket_seal"),
        target_epoch_randomness,
        BYTES(attempt)
    );

    let ticket_id = vrf_output(authority_secret_key, ticket_vrf_input);

Where:

• target_epoch_randomness: element of RandomnessBuffer which contains the randomness for the epoch the ticket is targeting.
• attempt: value going from 0 to the configured attempts_number - 1.

6.5.2. Tickets Threshold

A ticket is valid for on-chain submission if its TicketId value, when interpreted as a big-endian 256-bit integer normalized as a float within the range [0..1], is less than the ticket threshold computed as:

T = (r·s)/(a·v)

Where:

• v: epoch’s authorities number
• s: epoch’s slots number
• r: redundancy factor
• a: attempts number

In an epoch with s slots, the goal is to achieve an expected number of valid tickets equal to r·s.

It’s crucial to ensure that the probability of having fewer than s winning tickets is very low, even in scenarios where up to 1/3 of the authorities might be offline. To accomplish this, we first define the winning probability of a single ticket as T = (r·s)/(a·v).

Let n be the actual number of participating authorities, where v·2/3 ≤ n ≤ v. These n authorities each make a attempts, for a total of a·n attempts.

Let X be the random variable associated to the number of winning tickets, then its expected value is E[X] = T·a·n = (r·s·n)/v. By setting r = 2, we get s·4/3 ≤ E[X] ≤ s·2. Using Bernestein’s inequality we get Pr[X < s] ≤ e^(-s/21).

For instance, with s = 600 this results in Pr[X < s] < 4·10⁻¹³. Consequently, this approach offers considerable tolerance for offline nodes and ensures that all slots are likely to be filled with tickets.

For more details about threshold formula refer to probabilities and parameters paragraph in the Web3 Foundation description of the protocol.

6.5.3. Ticket Envelope

Each ticket candidate is represented by a TicketEnvelope:

    TicketEnvelope ::= Sequence {
        attempt: Unsigned8,
        extra: OctetString,
        signature: RingVrfSignature
    }   

Where:

• attempt: Index associated to the ticket.
• extra: Additional data available for user-defined applications.
• signature: Ring VRF signature of the envelope data (attempt and extra).

Envelope data is signed using Bandersnatch Ring VRF (5.4.2).

    let signature = ring_vrf_sign(
        secret_key,
        ring_prover
        ticket_vrf_input,
        extra,
    );

With ticket_vrf_input defined as in 6.5.1.

6.6. On-chain Tickets Validation

Validation rules:

1. Ring VRF signature is verified using the ring_verifier derived by the constant ring context parameters (SNARK SRS) and the next epoch authorities public keys.

2. TicketId is locally computed from the RingVrfSignature and its value is checked to be less than tickets’ threshold.

3. On-chain tickets submission can’t occur within a block part of the epoch’s tail, which encompasses a configurable number of slots at the end of the epoch. This constraint is to give time to persisted on-chain tickets to be probabilistically (or even better deterministically) finalized and thus to further reduce the fork chances at the beginning of the target epoch.

4. All tickets which are proposed within a block must be valid and all of them must end up being persisted on-chain. Because the total number of tickets persisted on-chain is limited by to the epoch’s length, this may require to drop some of the previously persisted tickets. We remove tickets with greater TicketId value first.

5. No tickets duplicates are allowed.

If at least one of the checks fails then the block must be considered invalid.

Pseudo-code for ticket validation for steps 1 and 2:

    let ticket_vrf_input = CONCAT(
        BYTES("sassafras_ticket_seal"),
        target_epoch_randomness,
        BYTES(envelope.attempt)
    );

    let result = ring_vrf_verify(
        ring_verifier,
        ticket_vrf_input,
        envelope.extra,
        envelope.ring_signature
    );
    ASSERT(result == 1);

    let ticket_id = ring_vrf_signed_output(envelope.ring_signature);
    ASSERT(ticket_id < ticket_threshold);

Valid tickets are persisted on-chain in a bounded sorted sequence of TicketBody objects. Items within this sequence are sorted according to their TicketId, interpreted as a 256-bit big-endian unsigned integer.

    TicketBody ::= Sequence {
        id: TicketId,
        attempt: Unsigned8,
        extra: OctetString,
    }

    Tickets ::= Sequence<TicketBody>

The on-chain tickets sequence length bound is set equal to the epoch length in slots according to the protocol configuration.

6.7. Ticket-Slot Binding

Before the beginning of the target epoch, the on-chain sequence of tickets must be associated to epoch’s slots such that there is at most one ticket per slot.

Given an ordered sequence of tickets [t₀, t₁, ..., tₙ], the tickets are associated according to the following outside-in strategy:

    slot_index  : [  0,  1,  2,  3 ,  ... ]
    tickets     : [ t₀, tₙ, t₁, tₙ₋₁, ... ]

Here slot_index is the slot number relative to the epoch’s first slot: slot_index = slot - epoch_first_slot.

The association between tickets and a slots is recorded on-chain and thus is public. What remains confidential is the ticket’s author identity, and consequently, who is enabled to claim the corresponding slot. This information is known only to the ticket’s author.

If the number of published tickets is less than the number of epoch’s slots, some orphan slots at the end of the epoch will remain unbounded to any ticket. For orphan slots claiming strategy refer to 6.8.2. Note that this fallback situation always apply to the first two epochs after genesis.

6.8. Slot Claim

With tickets bounded to the target epoch slots, every designated authority acquires the information about the slots for which they are required to produce a block.

The procedure for slot claiming depends on whether a given slot has an associated ticket according to the on-chain state. If a slot has an associated ticket, then the primary authoring method is used. Conversely, the protocol resorts to the secondary method as a fallback.

6.8.1. Primary Method

An authority, can claim a slot using the primary method if it is the legit owner of the ticket associated to the given slot.

Let target_epoch_randomness be the entry in RandomnessBuffer relative to the epoch the block is targeting and attempt be the attempt used to construct the ticket associated to the slot to claim, the VRF input for slot claiming is constructed as:

    let seal_vrf_input = CONCAT(
        BYTES("sassafras_ticket_seal"),
        target_epoch_randomness,
        BYTES(attempt)
    );

The seal_vrf_input, when signed with the correct authority secret key, must generate the same TicketId which has been associated to the target slot according to the on-chain state.

6.8.2. Secondary Method

Given that the authorities scheduled for the target epoch are kept on-chain in an ordered sequence, the index of the authority which has the privilege to claim an orphan slot is given by the following procedure:

    let hash_input = CONCAT(
        target_epoch_randomness,
        ENCODE(relative_slot_index),
    );
    let hash = BLAKE2(hash_input);
    let index_bytes = CONCAT(GET(hash, 0), GET(hash, 1), GET(hash, 2), GET(hash, 3));
    let index = DECODE<Unsigned32>(index_bytes) % LENGTH(authorities);

With relative_slot_index the slot offset relative to the target epoch’s start and authorities the sequence of target epoch authorities.

    let seal_vrf_input = CONCAT(
        BYTES("sassafras_fallback_seal"),
        target_epoch_randomness
    );

6.8.3. Claim Data

ClaimData is a digest entry which contains additional information required by the protocol to verify the block:

    ClaimData ::= Sequence {
        slot: Unsigned32,
        authority_index: Unsigned32,
        randomness_source: VrfSignature,
    }

• slot: The slot number
• authority_index: Block’s author index relative to the on-chain authorities sequence.
• randomness_source: VRF signature used to generate per-block randomness.

Given the seal_vrf_input constructed using the primary or secondary method, the randomness source signature is generated as follows:

    let randomness_vrf_input = CONCAT(
        BYTES("sassafras_randomness"),
        vrf_output(authority_secret_key, seal_vrf_input)
    );

    let randomness_source = vrf_sign(
        authority_secret_key,
        randomness_vrf_input,
        []
    );

    let claim = SlotClaim {
        slot,
        authority_index,
        randomness_source
    };

    PUSH(block_header.digest, ENCODE(claim));

The ClaimData object is SCALE encoded and pushed as the second-to-last element of the header digest log.

6.8.4. Block Seal

A block is finally sealed as follows:

    let unsealed_header_byets = ENCODE(block_header);

    let seal = vrf_sign(
        authority_secret_key,
        seal_vrf_input,
        unsealed_header_bytes
    );

    PUSH(block_header.digest, ENCODE(seal));

With block_header the block’s header without the seal digest log entry.

The seal object is a VrfSignature, which is SCALE encoded and pushed as the last entry of the header digest log.

6.9. Slot Claim Verification

The last entry is extracted from the header digest log, and is SCALE decoded as a VrfSignature object. The unsealed header is then SCALE encoded in order to be verified.

The next entry is extracted from the header digest log, and is SCALE decoded as a ClaimData object.

The validity of the two signatures is assessed using as the authority public key corresponding to the authority_index found in the ClaimData, together with the VRF input (which depends on primary/secondary method) and additional data used by the block author.

    let seal_signature = DECODE<VrfSignature>(POP(header.digest));
    let unsealed_header_bytes = ENCODE(header);
    let claim_data = DECODE<ClaimData>(POP(header.digest));

    let authority_public_key = GET(authorities, claim_data.authority_index);

    // Verify seal signature
    let result = vrf_verify(
        authority_public_key,
        seal_vrf_input,
        unsealed_header_bytes,
        seal_signature
    );
    ASSERT(result == 1);

    let randomness_vrf_input = CONCAT(
        BYTES("sassafras_randomness"),
        vrf_signed_output(seal_signature)
    );

    // Verify per-block entropy source signature
    let result = vrf_verify(
        authority_public_key,
        randomness_vrf_input,
        [],
        claim_data.randomness_source
    );
    ASSERT(result == 1);

With:

• header: The block’s header.
• authorities: Sequence of authorities for the target epoch, as recorded on-chain.
• seal_vrf_input: VRF input data constructed as specified in 6.8.

If signatures verification is successful, then the verification process diverges based on whether the slot is associated with a ticket according to the on-chain state.

6.9.1. Primary Method

For slots tied to a ticket, the primary verification method is employed. This method verifies ticket ownership using the TicketId associated to the slot.

    let ticket_id = vrf_signed_output(seal_signature);
    ASSERT(ticket_id == expected_ticket_id);

With expected_ticket_id the ticket identifier committed on-chain in the associated TicketBody.

6.9.2. Secondary Method

If the slot doesn’t have any associated ticket, then the authority_index contained in the ClaimData must match the one returned by the procedure outlined in section 6.8.2.

6.10. Randomness Accumulator

The randomness accumulator is updated using the randomness_source signature found within the ClaimData object. In particular, fresh randomness is derived and accumulated after block execution as follows:

    let fresh_randomness = vrf_signed_output(claim.randomness_source);  
    randomness_buffer[0] = BLAKE2(CONCAT(randomness_buffer[0], fresh_randomness));

7. Drawbacks

None

8. Testing, Security, and Privacy

It is critical that implementations of this RFC undergo thorough rigorous testing. A security audit may be desirable to ensure the implementation does not introduce emergent side effects.

9. Performance, Ergonomics, and Compatibility

9.1. Performance

Adopting Sassafras consensus marks a significant improvement in reducing the frequency of short-lived forks which are eliminated by design.

Forks may only result from network disruption or protocol attacks. In such cases, the choice of which fork to follow upon recovery is clear-cut, with only one valid option.

9.2. Ergonomics

No specific considerations.

9.3. Compatibility

The adoption of Sassafras affects the native client and thus can’t be introduced via a “simple” runtime upgrade.

A deployment strategy should be carefully engineered for live networks. This subject is left open for a dedicated RFC.

10. Prior Art and References

• Sassafras layman introduction
• Sassafras research paper
• Bandersnatch VRFs specification
• Bandersnatch VRFs reference implementation
• W3F Ring VRF research paper
• Sassafras reference implementation tracking issue
• Sassafras reference implementation main PR

11. Unresolved Questions

None

12. Future Directions and Related Material

While this RFC lays the groundwork and outlines the core aspects of the protocol, several crucial topics remain to be addressed in future RFCs.

12.1. Interactions with On-Chain Code

• Storage: Types, organization and genesis configuration.

• Host interface: Interface that the hosting environment exposes to on-chain code (also known as host functions).

• Unrecorded on-chain interface. Interface that on-chain code exposes to the hosting environment (also known as runtime API).

• Transactional on-chain interface. Interface that on-chain code exposes to the World to alter the state (also known as transactions or extrinsics in the Polkadot ecosystem).

12.2. Deployment Strategies

• Protocol Migration. Investigate of how Sassafras can seamlessly replace an already operational instance of another protocol. Future RFCs may focus on deployment strategies to facilitate a smooth transition.

12.3. ZK-SNARK Parameters

• Parameters Setup: Determine the setup procedure for the zk-SNARK SRS (Structured Reference String) initialization. Future RFCs may provide insights into whether this process should include an ad-hoc initialization ceremony or if we can reuse an SRS from another ecosystem (e.g. Zcash or Ethereum).

12.4. Anonymous Submission of Tickets.

• Mixnet Integration: Submitting tickets directly to the relay can pose a risk of potential deanonymization through traffic analysis. Subsequent RFCs may investigate the potential for incorporating mix network protocol or other privacy-enhancing mechanisms to address this concern.